Introduction
Consumer preference for familiar, locally produced goods has recently been shown for many products and services, ranging from food items (Carroll et al., 2013; Meas et al., 2015) to equity investments in pension plans (Brown, Pollet, and Weisbenner, 2015) . In proposing the familiarity hypothesis, Huberman (2001) uses as illustration the tendency of shareholders of a Regional Bell
Operating Company (RBOC) to live in the area served and the tendency of RBOC customers prefer shares over other forms of RBOC equity. He then suggests that agents naturally have more favorable and charitable feelings toward institutions with which they are comfortable or familiar, with the caveat that disentangling familiarity from information asymmetries is difficult. Ackert et al. (2005) attempt to tease out information asymmetries and familiarity in the case of an investor's predisposition to invest close to home (home bias). In a series of experiments in the US and Canada, they find that merely providing information about a firm's home base, while holding other information asymmetries constant, is insufficient to alter investment behavior. Agents gain no incentive to invest in a company simply because of geographic proximity.
Rather, participants need to know the firm's name and home base before they become more inclined to invest. Participants, it turns out, have a higher perceived familiarity with those firms whose name and home base they know. Thus, perceived knowledge (familiarity) appears to be a key determinant of investment behavior in the explanation of home bias.
Baltzer, Stolper, and Walter (2011) , who study individual investor portfolio investments, find strong and consistent overinvestment in nearby companies. Their results explicitly reject the hypothesis of an information home-field advantage of local over non-local investors, and instead find household preference for local equity to be familiarity-driven.
Bailey, Kumar and Ng (2012) , who study a host of behavioral biases of mutual fund investors, find that familiarity is only positively correlated bias with stock portfolio performance.
They note that familiarity bias may be the only bias among several studied that is not necessarily detrimental. Boyle et al. (2011) theoretically predict and empirically support the flight of individual investors to local familiarity, especially during periods of financial crisis. They suggest the effect of familiarity investment behavior could depend on conditions in the broader environment.
Our purpose here is to test for familiarity bias and the hypothesis of flight to familiarity using individual depositor behavior. If familiarity is critical to other investment behavior, we expect to observe it in perhaps the commonest of investment behaviors, depositing money in a bank. Because individuals usually deposit funds in very limited number of banks (maybe just one), and because information about banks is more asymmetric than for firms in general, our challenge is to assess the familiarity bias in a banking context. The overwhelming bulk of depositors for practical reasons entrust their money to a nearby bank. As most local banks have wellestablished names in the community, classic measures of familiarity, proximity, and name recognition are meaningless. Thus, we define familiarity here in terms of comforting cues in the bank's name.
Given the inclination depositors to place their deposits just a few banks, the challenge becomes measuring differences in investment behavior. A good starting point is the approach of Hunter and Walker (1996) , who test their hypothesis that white loan officers, because of a lack of familiarity with minority applicants, tend rely more heavily on borrower characteristics that can be observed at low cost (e.g. objective loan application measures) in evaluating the creditworthiness of minority applicants relative to white applicants. Not surprisingly, they find that marginal black and Hispanic applicants are held to higher quantitative standards on objective factors such as credit history and debt obligations than similar marginal white applicants. In other words, bank officers impose greater discipline on unfamiliar applicants.
This approach translates seamlessly to the study of bank depositor behavior toward banks. We can verify whether depositors exert higher discipline on unfamiliar banks than familiar banks, and even if this discipline is applied sporadically such as during a financial crisis. The approach also ties in with the literature on market discipline in banking and depositor discipline specifically.
Market discipline requires that depositors have access to both information on bank risk and anticipate bearing a cost in the event of bank insolvency. The US is clearly the most-studied area in this regard. For example, Park and Peristiani (1998) demonstrate a negative relationship between the predicted probability of failure of a thrift and subsequent growth of large uninsured deposits in the thrift. They also demonstrate that the predicted probability of failure has an adverse effect on the growth and pricing of insured deposits (although less than for larger and partially uninsured deposits). Others established empirical relations between cost of funds and lagged measures of depositor risk involving US institutions include capital-to-assets ratios, the variability and the magnitude of return on assets, and loan quality exposure to junk bonds (Brewer and Mondschean, 1994; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Park and Peristiani, 1998) .
Rather than focus on the US, we consider familiarity bias in depositor behavior in Russia's regional deposit markets. Although the Russian banking market has an integrated set of core institutions providing regulation, bank supervision, bank taxation, deposit insurance and central bank policy, as well as many common risks such as exchange rate risk and interbank market instability, Russia's regional retail banking markets are strongly segmented, with the retail deposit market the most segmented of all. Moreover, outside Moscow, banking competition is largely regional, not federal. We can exploit this strong regional segmentation of Russia's retail deposit markets, because, with all other relevant factors set constant, it entails familiarity of household individuals with banks that are visibly related to the locality or the region. In addition,
Russia provides a number of natural experiments in the form of deposit insurance and financial crises that can help in identifying a potential flight to familiarity effect.
The above overview of market discipline in the US market suggests that the two ways of studying market discipline of household depositors can be combined. For the mechanism of price-based discipline, researchers seek to establish the link between a bank's deposit interest rates and its riskiness. For the mechanism of quantity-based discipline, they try to show that less risky banks attract more deposits, resulting in higher deposit growth rates and larger market shares.
We also find strong empirical evidence of market discipline in the retail deposit markets of developing and transition economies, including Russia. For example, Semenova (2007) and Karas, Pyle, and Schoors (2010, 2013) show that household depositors in Russia exert quantitybased discipline and price-based (albeit weak) discipline on banks. Peresetsky (2008) provides additional support for the presence of price-based discipline exerted by Russian household depositors.
Market discipline, which is crucial for efficient distribution of funds in the deposit market, is typically fragile and easily undermined. This is because household depositors face high monitoring costs, lack sophistication on financial matters, and are sensitive to non-risk-related information. Financial crisis may reduce market discipline (Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2015; Cubillas, Fonseca, and González, 2012) because of crisis-related government intervention. Depositors may even abandon altogether their efforts to monitor the reliability of their own banks aand simply follow the information signals from the macroeconomic situation, other depositor behavior, or rumors (Hasan et al., 2013) . As shown by Karas, Pyle, and Schoors (2010) for the Russian default in 1998, a crisis can also serve as wake-up call for household depositors in the absence of government bailouts of individual banks.
Another factor undermining market discipline is the set of explicit guaranties provided by deposit insurance schemes. Peresetsky (2008) and Karas et al. (2013) institutions, feel no need to monitor the financial condition of their banks (Semenova, 2007) . We therefore exclude such banks from our sample.
Our central hypothesis is that depositors feel less compelled to exert discipline on familiar banks, measured as banks with local or regional references in their names, especially in times of crisis. We also expect depositors to exhibit a flight to familiarity in times of crisis, thereby reducing market discipline exerted on familiar banks in the post-crisis period relative to the change in discipline exerted on non-familiar banks. Our competing hypothesis is that banks with clear regional references in their name have strong ties with the regional government, rather than familiarity with depositors, and therefore enjoy a form of implicit protection from the local government, making retail depositors less sensitive to the risk of these banks when deciding to withdraw in response to the bank's deteriorated financial position.
To disentangle these two hypotheses, we interact our variables with measures of trust in local government and regional affinity. We find that the flight to familiarity effect is strongly present in regions with strong regional affinity, while the effect is rejected in regions with more trust in regional and local governments. This indicates our results are driven by familiarity, not implicit protection from trusted regional or local governments.
This paper extends the literature on familiarity bias in that it identifies a flight to familiarity effect in the case of Russian household depositors in times of crisis. It also contributes to the market discipline discussion by adding flight to familiarity as a determinant of changes in market discipline during financial crisis. It adds to the deposit insurance literature by showing how the impact of deposit insurance on household depositor behavior is mediated by familiarity with a specific bank.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Russia's regional deposit markets. Section 3 lays out our hypotheses and methods for testing. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
Regional deposit markets in Russia
Russia's 85 or so formal federal subjects (oblast, krai, autonomous republic, etc.) span eleven time zones. These regions are not only wide-ranging geographically, but in terms of income, urbanization rates, spending habits, saving behavior patterns, ethnicity, and language. Accordingly, there exists great cross-regional variation in the size of deposit markets and the number and types of the banks and branches functioning in Russian regions. This creates considerable space for region-specific competition. The largest regional network belongs to state-dominated giant, Sberbank, which controlled about half of the personal deposit market during our 2001-2010 observation period. To a significant degree, the cross-regional diversity in deposit market competition is determined by the differences in the Sberbank participation, which varies strongly across regions (see Figure   A4 in Appendix I). Sberbank, once the main Soviet household retail bank, most maintains branches in the wealthy regions of central and northern Russia. It has far fewer branches in eastern regions.
The size of the regional market also matters. Most deposits are concentrated in the European half of Russia. As Figure A5 in Appendix I suggests, more than a half of Russian territory belongs to the regions with very narrow deposit markets. The large markets are in rich and populous regions. For these regions, we also observe the highest deposits per capita (see Figure A6 in Appendix I).
Methodology and data
We introduce a simple proxy for a depositor's regional familiarity with a bank. If the bank's name contains words related to its regional location, we assume the household depositor perceives more familiarity with the bank. We introduce two degrees of regional familiarity. A bank is considered familiar to household depositors of the region (R) if the bank name contains the name of the region (e.g. Altay Bank), the name of a major city in the region (e.g. Bank of Moscow), or a familiar city landmark (e.g. Okhotny Ryad). We thus track all name changes on a quarterly basis using two databases of Russian bank profiles:
Allbanks.ru and BanksBD.spb.ru. MD stands for the measure of market discipline at bank i in region r in quarter t. Our measures of MD are the personal deposit interest rate (IR) for price discipline and the personal deposit growth rate (DG) for quantity discipline. R is a binary proxy for bank's regional ties. In the robustness check section, we replace it with Rb, which represents the regionally-tied banks under our broader definition of regional affinity. BF stands for a vector of bank fundamentals that measures bank riskiness. These include capital adequacy, measured by the capital-to-assets ratio (CA); liquidity, measured by the liquid assets-to-total assets ratio (LA); asset quality, measured by the share of non-performing loans (NPL); and bank size, measured by the natural logarithm of bank total assets (lnA). As bank exposure to deposits may influence pricing policy and growth opportunities, we also include the deposits-to-assets ratio (DA). We control for the timing of the bank's entry into the deposit insurance system (DIS) by introducing a binary variable equal to 1 if bank i was accepted into the DIS in quarter t, and 0 otherwise (DIS). We also introduce quarteryear fixed effects and regional fixed effects.
To test H2 we modify the initial regression and estimate it on the data for 2001-2010, which includes crisis quarters:
Crisis is a binary variable equal to one if quarter t is within the period 2008-2009, and zero otherwise. This controls for the effects of the financial crisis in Russia. Table 2 shows the expected effects on deposit growth and the deposit rate. To test hypotheses H3.1 and H3.2, we introduce the proxy for trust in regional authorities and the regionalism index. We measure depositor trust in regional and local authorities by the share of the region's population that supports the actions and policy of the regional govern- To construct a regionalism index, we use the data provided by Berkowitz, Hoekstra, and Schoors (2014), selecting components that might explain the current level of regionalism based on the region's experience during the transition era (or even Soviet era). The population is considered stable and homogenous if it had low ethno-linguistic fractionalization in 1989 (ELF89), and low in-migration (measured as migration inflows per 10,000 inhabitants, 1986 -1990 . Less urbanized regions with lower shares of middle-class inhabitants also tend to show higher regional affinity. We measure the former by the share of urban population in 1996 (Urban96) and the latter by the share of white-collar workers in the workforce in 1989 (MidClass89).
The data come from Goskomstat regional statistics almanacs.
Indications of political and economic conservatism also boost the regionalism measure.
We proxy this by the share of votes for Yeltsin received in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections (Vote4Yelt96), because Yeltsin stood for economic and political reforms in that period.
Thus, a higher regional vote for Yeltsin in 1996 indicates higher regional pro-market sentiment that translates to greater openness and a lower regional focus today.
Higher past government involvement in the economic processes of the region is also assumed to result in a lower degree of regionalism as the population became habituated to government assistance and control, and thereby give up on the notion of independent economic agency of the region. To measure this, we introduce the shares of production subsidies (ProdSub95) and agriculture subsidies (AgriSub95) in the region budgets in 1995 and the share of enterprises in commerce, public catering and public services owned as a state or municipal property (as of June 1997, State&MunFirms97) . The data on these three measures are taken from Remington (2011). Table 3 shows the correlations between different measures of the regionalism.
Most correlations are statistically significant and some quite high. Thus, we are unable to include them directly in our regionalism index. To construct the regionalism index (RIndex), we perform a principal component analysis on above-mentioned nine factors. The first three components explain 69.46% of the variation. Using the eigenvalues, we sum them into the index. Table 4 shows the results of the PCA analysis. The correlations suggest that a higher score on the index corresponds to a lower degree of regionalism as the index is associated with higher state economic dependence, higher mobility, higher propensity to economic reforms, etc. The index, therefore, is decreasing in regionalism. To test hypotheses H3.1 and H3.2, we separate the sample by the median values of the regionalism index (for H3.1) and our proxy for trust in regional authorities (for H3.2). Table 5 shows the shares of familiar banks are slightly lower in regions with low levels of trust in regional authorities and in regions with low levels of regionalism.
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Depositor discipline in Russian regions: Flight to familiarity or trust in local authorities? Table 5 Share of banks with regional ties in sub-samples We run our previous regressions separately for the subsamples provided in Table 5 to identify the mechanism underlying regional references related to lower market discipline. Where we observe deterioration of market discipline for familiar banks only in the regions with a high degree of trust in local authorities, we cannot reject the alternative hypothesis of implicit support by trusted regional authorities (H3.2). Conversely, where we observe deterioration of market discipline for familiar banks only in regions with high levels of regionalism, we cannot reject that we have identified the flight to familiarity hypothesis (H3.1). To eliminate the influence of outliers, we winsorize the sample by 1% from each tail. We exclude the observations with negative capital adequacy and liquidity ratios as those with mistakes. We exclude Moscow banks from the sample as many operate outside Moscow, making it impossible to ascribe regional characteristics to them. As mentioned, state banks and foreign banks are also excluded. There are between 688 and 696 banks in our sample, depending on the model specification. Table 6 includes the descriptive statistics for the variables used.
Results

Market discipline and bank familiarity
We start by looking separately to the group of the familiar banks and checking if they are different in terms of deposit growth and interest rates as well as overall riskiness. Table 7 compares the banks with and without regional references and shows the t-test results for the equality of means.
Two types of banks do not differ in terms of bank size or liquidity. However, familiar banks show lower capital adequacy, while unfamiliar ones have higher credit risks. Interestingly, the familiar banks pay lower interest rates than those without regional cues in their name, but the latter gain higher average deposit growth rates. rates, an effect that appears solely in specification IV.
Contrary to our predictions for H1, regional cues in a bank's name do not alleviate market discipline exerted by depositors in stable times. Indeed, depositors of familiar banks were more sensitive to important, easily observable bank fundamentals of bank capitalization before the financial crisis of 2008. This is shown by the strongly significant and positive coefficients in specification II and IV of the deposit growth panel. In fact, it appears that familiar banks faced more intense quantity disciplining in stable times. This is not necessarily bad news, of course, as these banks tended to be more risky than unfamiliar banks (as seen in the summary statistiscs).
There was no such difference between familiar and unfamiliar banks for price-based discipline.
The financial crisis of 2008 can be described as a pure exogenous shock to the Russian banking system. During the financial crisis, price-based and quantitative market discipline weakened for all Russian banks, a finding in line with a cross-country study of Cubillas et al. (2012) .
Indeed, the very weak mechanism of price-based discipline with respect to loan quality that existed before the 2008 crisis is undone during the post-crisis period. As for the quantity-based discipline, depositors lose their sensitivity to capital adequacy and liquidity. As we hypothesized in H2, this moral hazard effect with respect to capital sensitivity is especially pronounced for familiar banks. Indeed, while familiar banks have a greater sensitivity to capital adequacy than unfamiliar banks in the pre-crisis period, this order reverses in the post-crisis period, with the capital sensitivity of familiar banks essentially falling to zero. Unfamiliar banks, in contrast, retain the same level of market discipline as before the crisis. The deposit growth sensitivity to loan quality is unaffected by bank familiarity or the occurrence of a crisis and remains at a constant level throughout Table 8 .
Koen Table 8 Market discipline and regional references 2001-2007 2001-2010 2001-2007 2001-2010 I  II  III  IV  I  II  III For the moment, at least, we can not reject the flight to familiarity hypothesis in H2. The must still attempt to disentangle the flight to familiarity effect from the alternative hypothesis of implicit support by trusted regional authorities to banks with regional cues in their names.
Variables
MD=Interest Rate MD=Deposit Growth
Implicit guaranties or flight to familiarity?
We offer two competing hypotheses for interpretation of the moral hazard effect during crisis periods for banks with local references in their names. Table 9 shows the estimates of our main regressions (specifications II and IV for the deposit growth) for two sets of subsamples. The first four columns deal with the first set of subsamples: regions with above-median and below-median shares of popular trust in local authorities. The remaining four columns show results for the second set of subsamples: regions with above-median and below-median reading in the regionalism index (decreasing in regionalism).
Our results clearly support the flight to familiarity hypothesis of H3.1. During the crisis, market discipline is undermined only in regions with above-median levels of regionalism. Depositors in regions that are strongly attached to their region become less sensitive to the observable risk of familiar banks relative to unfamiliar banks and to regions with less regional affinity.
This effect is absent in the first four columns, where we split our sample in to above-and belowmedian levels of trust in local authorities. While we cannot reject a flight to familiarity of household depositors in times of crisis, we can reject the alternative hypothesis that our measure of familiarity captures ties with the regional government and implicit subsidies.
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Robustness checks
To assure robustness, we divide the sample into a series of alternative sub-samples left and right from the median of the individual components of the regionalism index and re-estimate our main specifications. The results for capital adequacy are presented in panels A-C of Table 10 , the full regression results can be found in Tables A1 to A4 in Appendix II. We observe that the sensitivity of the deposit growth to capital adequacy tends to disappear in regions that were characterized in the past by lower state involvement (higher share of subsidies in agriculture), less pro-market sentiment (lower share of votes for Yeltsin), stronger conservatism, higher stability and homogeneity (migration, urbanization, share of middle class, etc.). For further robustness checking, we repeat our main estimations for a broader definition of bank familiarity to now include banks with names refer to the city, a local landmark or some broader area (Rb). The results of the H1 and H2 estimations for this broader definition of familiarity are Andrey Zubanov
Depositor discipline in Russian regions: Flight to familiarity or trust in local authorities? 24 presented in Table A5 . Table A6 shows the results for H3.1 and H3.2 (both in Appendix II). The results are virtually the same as under the stricter definition of bank familiarity.
These findings suggest stronger quantity-based disciplining for familiar banks in stable times and an absence of sensitivity to capital adequacy during crisis episodes. The latter appears again only in regions with higher levels of regionalism. 9 The main qualitative difference is that the evidence for the overall deterioration of market discipline during the crisis is much weaker.
A final robustness check involves the exclusion of two additional large regions from the initial samples -the Moscow region (Moscow oblast) and the city of Saint Petersburg. Both regions contain multiregional banks (although far fewer that in the city of Moscow) with branches in multiple regions that could distort the regional component of our study. These results are presented in Tables A7 and A8 in Appendix II. 10 They generally support the results of the precrisis and the post-crisis period, as well as the regionalism hypothesis.
Conclusions
Our objective in this study was to analyze whether depositor familiarity with a bank affects their behavior during a financial crisis. Bank familiarity was measured by identifying regional or local cues in the bank's name. We measured depositor behavior by market discipline, i.e. the depositor's sensitivity to observable bank risk. Since we need an exogenous crisis and regional variation in bank familiarity, we use Russia as a testing ground.
Using 2001-2010 bank-level and region-level data for Russia, we show the evidence that depositors use quantity-based discipline on all banks in the sample. The evidence of a pricebased discipline mechanism, however, is virtually absent. We find that depositors of familiar banks become less sensitive to bank risk after a financial crisis relative to depositors of unfamiliar banks. More specifically, depositors show heightened sensitivity to the capital adequacy of familiar banks compared to unfamiliar banks in the pre-crisis period. During the crisis period, however, capital sensitivity for familiar banks falls to zero, while depositor sensitivity to unfamiliar banks in terms of the level of market discipline exerted remains at the same level as before the crisis.
We make sure that our results are not driven by implicit support of regional governments to banks with regional ties, but actually by familiarity bias, by interacting our variables of interest with measures of trust in local governments and regional affinity. We find that our flight to familiarity effect cannot be rejected in regions with strong regionalism, while the effect is rejected in regions where the population has greater trust in regional and local government. This reinforces the view that our results are driven by familiarity and not implicit protection from a trusted regional or local governments.
Thus, the decline in depositor discipline in the Russian banking sector in response to the financial crisis was not driven by implicit guarantees from regional governments, but rather by a "flight to familiarity," a behavioral bias well established for other forms of investments. Further research might consider whether this feature of market discipline extends beyond the Russian banking market and whether familiar banks can strategically exploit this familiarity bias by taking on more risk in the immediate post-crisis period and avoid a penalty for increased deposit funding costs. 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 0 Depositor discipline in Russian regions: Flight to familiarity or trust in local authorities? Table A5 Market discipline and regional ties (broad definition) 2001-2007 2001-2010 2001-2007 2001-2010 I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 2001 -2007 2001 -2010 Depositor discipline in Russian regions: Flight to familiarity or trust in local authorities? Table A7 Market discipline and regional ties (Moscow region and St. Petersburg excluded) 2001-2007 2001-2010 2001-2007 2001-2010 I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix II Tables
Variables
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